Muse has a sophisticated internal permission model. But when it crosses into another company's application and signs in with the consumer's existing credentials or authenticated browser session, the receiving company generally sees the consumer, not the agent.
In identity terms, this is closer to impersonation than true delegation. It does not mean credentials are stolen, because the primary agent cannot see passwords or tokens. The issue is that the external application receives an action under the user's identity with no separate, verifiable agent identity behind it.
A shared session also breaks the audit trail. When every action arrives under the customer's login, the business cannot later separate what the person did from what the agent did on their behalf. That ambiguity is a problem for fraud teams, for dispute resolution, and for any regulator who asks the business to show who authorized a given transaction.
This matters more as agents move from low-risk research into higher-impact actions. Once money, health information, financial accounts, or legally meaningful commitments are involved, the cost of a wrong action climbs quickly.
A person logging into a bank and an agent accessing that bank on the person's behalf are not the same security event. They carry different risk, different intent, and different accountability, even when they use the same login. Treating them as identical hides exactly the information a business needs to make a good decision.
Today, many AI agent actions still look like customer actions. That is impersonation, not true delegation.
If an agent rebooks a trip, redeems loyalty points, changes a shipping address, applies a stored payment method, or accepts terms, the business needs three answers. It needs to know which agent is acting, what that agent was authorized to do, and whether the current action falls inside those limits. Today, a shared session answers none of those questions.